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Abstract 
 
The paper uses a panel of athletic department revenue and expenditure data of 227 
public colleges and universities to empirically investigate the behavior of NCAA 
Division I athletic departments over the period 2006 – 2011. Four primary 
hypotheses were tested: (1) the effect of revenue changes on individual 
expenditure categories, (2) how individual revenue streams influence total 
expenditures, (3) whether changes in individual revenue categories change the 
size of the athletic department’s subsidy, and (4) how total revenue and 
expenditures change when a school switches conference affiliation. The empirical 
results show that when a school receives additional athletic revenue, expenditures 
for coaches can be as high as 10 times more than direct expenditures for athletes. 
For every one dollar increase in ticket sale revenue, total expenditures can rise by 
$0.83 and reduce a school’s athletic subsidy by $0.19. Lastly, changing 
conferences can increase total revenue and total expenditures by millions of 
dollars.  
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NCAA Athletic Departments: An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Revenue and 
Conference Changes 
 
 
“The NCAA did a fabulous job of negotiating the most recent media rights agreement, but the 
$10.8 billion is what makes the headlines. Then you all go to your Rotary Clubs and say that 
in college sports we care about amateurism. And they look at you and say, ‘$10.8 billion and 
amateurism? Help me understand that.’” – NCAA Office of the President1 
 
I. Introduction 
Unlike traditional business enterprises, where profit-seeking is the generally-accepted modus 
operandi, the motivation for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is conflicted 
between amateurism and profit-making. While the NCAA states that amateurism and the 
protection of academic integrity are its unquestionable main goals, the large sums of money 
generated in college sports, specifically men’s football and basketball, have influenced how 
member schools behave.  
 In an overwhelming majority of scenarios, the pursuit of profits and student development 
– both academically and athletically – can happen simultaneously without major conflict. For 
example, the median NCAA scholarship football player will graduate with a college degree in 
four years, paying significantly lower than the sticker price of tuition, all while generating a net 
profit for the institution. However, profits can clash with amateurism and the academic best 
interests of student-athletes.
2
  
 These controversies are highlighted in men’s football and basketball, as these sports are 
profit-generators used to subsidize the remaining unprofitable NCAA sports, and in the 
                                                          
1
 http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/NCAA+President/On+the+Mark 
2
 West Virginia University’s (WVU) decision to leave the Big East Conference and join the Big 12 conference 
highlights the tension between profits and the academic best interests of student-athletes. The conference switch 
dramatically increased travel times for all of WVU’s athletic teams. WVU’s closest in-conference opponent is Iowa 
State University, a mere 870 miles away. The need for multiple-day travel, combined with the expansion of 
nationally televised weeknight games, has increased the amount of time student-athletes spend on the road at the 
expense of time available for students to attend class.  
 
2 
 
conference realignment debate. The lure of lucrative revenue deals from changing conferences 
dominated concerns over academic integrity. In total, 13 football subdivision (FBS) schools 
announced conference moves between 2010 and 2013.
3
 
 The primary objective of this paper is to analyze the behavior of NCAA institutions and 
their athletic departments, given their unique set of constraints and incentives. This paper tests 
four general hypotheses. First, this study investigates the effects of revenue changes on NCAA 
athletic department spending. Second, this study disaggregates revenue into five categories and 
tests how each revenue category affects total expenditures. Third, this study explores if revenue 
from ticket sales is a substitute or compliment to subsidy revenue from the institution. Lastly, 
this study measures the change in total revenue and expenditures for a school that changes 
athletic conferences. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the bureaucratic nature of college 
athletics. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the empirical specifications. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and provides interpretation. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
II. The Bureaucracy of College Athletics 
College athletics are filled with an interesting mix of competitive and heavily restricted markets. 
These markets operate under a set of guidelines orchestrated by a bureaucracy – the NCAA.4 
Individual institutions and athletic departments, smaller bureaucracies themselves, are actors 
within these markets. The bureaucratic nature of athletic departments provides the incentive to 
                                                          
3
 The FBS schools that  moved conferences were Rutgers - The State University of New Jersey, Syracuse 
University, Texas A&M University, Texas Christian University, the University of Colorado - Boulder, the 
University of Louisville, the University of Maryland – College Park, the University of Missouri - Columbia, the 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, the University of Notre Dame, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of 
Utah, and West Virginia University.   
4
 Along with being labeled a bureaucracy, the NCAA is often described in the academic literature as a cartel because 
of its restrictive policies. Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) and Fleisher et al. (1988) explore the self-monitoring and 
enforcement of the NCAA in the context of a cartel model.  
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pursue increased revenue. Between 2006 and 2011, median athletic department revenue grew 
$4.14 million, a 27.82 percent increase. Given the increased revenue, collegiate institutions faced 
several options for athletic department budgeting changes.  
 One option was for institutions to decrease athletic-department subsidies. The average 
athletic-department subsidy is $8.8 million annually.  These subsidies primarily consist of 
student fees earmarked for athletics. Thus, decreasing  athletic department subsidies would likely 
result in a marginally lower cost of education for students. 
 Alternatively, institutions could use increased athletic revenue to fund additional athletic 
expenditures. Applying Niskanen’s (1971) bureaucracy model with the institution as a funding 
sponsor and the athletic department as a bureau, the athletic department would exploit an 
informational advantage in order to spend all of its revenues each year and continually request 
additional funding in subsequent years. Wycoff (1990) expands Niskanen’s models, describing 
that bureaucrats will prefer to maximize discretionary spending and Hoffer (2013) adds that 
bureaucrats also generate rents to the factors of production, preferring to increase wage rates 
above equilibrium rather than increase labor hours (quantity). 
 However, the manner in which the athletic department can spend its funds is unique.
 5
  
The NCAA explicitly prohibits athletic departments from exercising these preferences by 
restricting payments to certain factor inputs. Most notably, collegiate athletes must be amateurs, 
receiving no compensation other than payments to cover the costs
6
 of attending the academic 
institution (i.e. tuition, room, board, etc.). 
                                                          
5
 The restrictions of markets give the NCAA an important responsibility to impartially enforce the regulations it sets. 
Depken and Wilson (2006) investigated how NCAA enforcement affects the competitive balance of major college 
football departments.   
6
 The term costs in this sentence does not include opportunity costs of attending college or participating in amateur 
athletics. 
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 The amateur-athlete provision substantially distorts the labor market for athletes.  
Institutions are unable to reward players with additional pay when players generate extra revenue 
for the school.  Schools are also unable to compete in the labor market using wages.  This forces 
athletic departments to compete by offering players non-monetary benefits.   
 School prestige and academic standards remain relatively steady, but recently, stadium 
upgrades and supplemental (practice) facilities have created a “facilities arms race” (Bennett, 
2012).    Table 1 provides a list of some of the most recent college football facility renovations.
7
  
Alabama’s $9 million locker room renovation includes an arcade, a nutrition bar, a 
“hydrotherapy area” (a hot and cold pool with a waterfall), and a “no expenses spared” locker 
area.  Nick Saban, Alabama’s head football coach – the highest paid public employee in the U.S. 
at $5.5 million per year – says about Alabama’s new facility, “Now, our players have one-stop 
shopping.  They can do everything in one place.  They don’t need to go outside.” 
[Insert Table 1] 
 Similarly, the University of Kentucky built a $7 million dorm facility to house its men’s 
basketball players.  The facility includes single rooms for each resident, a private chef, flat-
screen monitors describing each player’s itinerary, and a lounge complete with a pool table.  
 The competition for premier athletes persists because athletic departments seek benefits, 
other than profits, unique to contest markets: wins and championships.  Wins and championships 
generate large utility boosts for students, employees, fans, and alumni.  Empirical research has 
further investigated whether athletic department success generates positive externalities 
elsewhere for their institutions.
8
   
                                                          
7
 Virtual tours of the new Alabama locker room can be found, http://www.rolltide.com/allaccess/?media=394427. 
8
 A more complete summary of the literature regarding the effects of university athletics on the university can be 
found in Goff (2000). 
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 Frank (2004) found victories in men’s football and basketball had no statistically 
significant impact on the number of applications to the school or the SAT scores of the school’s 
applicants.  Conversely, Pope and Pope (2009) found that success in football and basketball, 
particularly for top-ranked teams and private schools, significantly increases the number of 
applications and the quality of applications to a school.  
 At least a dozen empirical studies have examined the relationship between atletic success 
and alumni donations, summarized in Frank (2004).  Several studies find that athletic success can 
increase donations, but Humphreys and Mondello (2007) describe how donations earmarked for 
athletics act as a substitute for unearmarked alumni donations, causing athletic success to have 
no statistical impact on total alumni donations.   
 Orszag and Orszag (2005) find no correlation between increased spending on athletics 
and wins.  Unfortunately for athletically-successful schools, the academic literature presents a 
mixed picture on the link between athletic success and additional benefits for the school. 
 Financially, college athletics represent a zero-sum game.  Orzag and Israel (2009) 
describe spending on athletics as an “arms race” between schools. Despite the glaring evidence 
that the financial incentives for athletic department spending are nonexistent, heavy competition 
for athletic success persists.  Unable to increase player pay, schools have found a number of 
ways to try and obtain those much sought-after wins.  
 While the market for student athletes has strict compensation restrictions, the market for 
coaches is relatively unregulated.  The result is that the salaries paid to head coaches in college 
football and basketball have skyrocketed.  In 39 states, the highest paid public employee is a 
college football or basketball coach, illustrated in Figure 1 in Appendix 1.   
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 These examples provide prima facie evidence that academic institutions and athletic 
departments spend vast amounts of money in recent years to compete for wins and 
championships, but little of that money has gone to player compensation. In the following 
section, we present data and a formal econometric model to explore athletic department spending 
practices. 
 
 
III. Data and Estimation 
The paper uses a panel of athletic department revenue and expenditure data of 227 public 
colleges and universities in the NCAA's Division I from 2006 to 2011. Private schools are not 
required to release revenue and expenditure reports publicly so they are excluded (e.g 
Northwestern University). Some states also shield public schools from fully disclosing their 
athletic revenue and expenditure data so they are also excluded (e.g. Temple University). The 
panel is unbalanced because not every school participated each year in the NCAA's Division I 
throughout the sample time period. Revenue and expenditure data are in constant 2012 USD. 
 Revenue data is divided among six categories: ticket sales, student fees, school funds, 
contributions, rights and licensing, and other revenue. Ticket sales are the sale of admissions to 
athletic events. Student fees represent the fees levied on students to support a school's athletic 
program. School funds are the direct and indirect financial support from the college or university 
towards athletic programs. Contributions are any additional financial contributions beyond ticket 
sales, such as alumni giving towards athletic programs.
9
 Rights and licensing represent revenue 
from media rights, sponsorships, licensing, advertisements, trademarks, and royalties. Any 
additional revenue stream, such as revenue from tournament or bowl game appearances is 
                                                          
9
 Coughlin and Erekson (1984) provide a systematic analysis of the economic determinants of athletic contributions. 
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captured in the category of other revenue. Total Revenue is the sum total of the six revenue 
categories.
10
 
 Expenditure data is divided among four categories: scholarships, coaching staff, building 
and grounds, and other expenditures. Scholarships represent athletically-related student aid. 
Coaching staff captures expenditures on coaching salaries, bonuses, and benefits. Building and 
grounds are all expenditures on facilities and maintenance. Any additional expenditure, such as 
conference dues and travel expenses, is lumped into other expenditures. Total expenditures is the 
sum total of the four revenue categories.    
 The paper tests four hypotheses using Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
estimations. Fixed school effects are included as specified by the Hausman test. Time effects are 
included because the null hypothesis that all year coefficients are jointly equal to zero was 
rejected. Robust standard errors are used to reduce idiosyncratic disturbances through time.
11
 For 
robustness, each of these models are tested with all colleges included, when only Bowl 
Championship Series (BCS) conferences are included, when only non-BCS conferences are 
included, and when only Automatic Qualifying (AQ) conferences are included. 
12
 
 To test hypothesis one, model (1) measures the effect of an additional dollar of total 
revenue on each expenditure category, excluding total expenditures. The basic specification of 
the empirical model is: 
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 Table 9 includes a more detailed description of the expenditure and revenue variables and Table 10 provides 
summary statistics. Both tables are in Appendix 1.  
11
 The models were also estimated using clustered standard errors (clustered by conference), in order to reduce 
idiosyncratic disturbances across conferences through time. Using clustered standard errors does not change the 
basic results and the results are available upon request.   
12
 BCS conferences are all eleven conferences in the NCAA Division I for football, the six automatic qualifying 
conferences and the five non-automatic qualifying conferences. An AQ conference is an athletic conference whose 
league champion receives an automatic berth in one of the five football Bowl Championship Series bowl games. The 
six AQ conferences are the American Athletic Conference (formerly the Big East), the Atlantic Coast Conference 
(ACC), the Big Ten Conference, the Big 12 Conference, the Pac-12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference 
(SEC). The five non-automatic qualifying conferences are Conference USA, the Mid-American Conference (MAC), 
the Mountain West Conference (MWC), and the Sun Belt Conference. 
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Expenditure Categoryi,t = αi + β1Total Revenuei,t-1 + ηt + εit (1) 
where i and t are the school and year indices, respectively, αi represents school fixed effects, and 
ηt represents time effects.
13
  
 To test hypothesis two, model (2) explores the degree to which each revenue category 
affects total expenditures. The basic specification of the empirical model is: 
Total Expendituresi,t = αi + β1 Ticket Salesi,t-1 + β2Student Feesi,t-1  + β3School Fundsi,t-1 +  
β4 Contributionsi,t-1 + β5 Other Revenuei,t-1 + ηt + εit (2) 
where i and t are the school and year indices, respectively, αi represents school fixed effects, and 
ηt represents time effects. 
 Testing hypothesis three, model (3)   measures how changes in revenue categories affect 
the size of the athletic subsidy. Since the athletic subsidy is defined as the sum of student fees 
plus school funds, the basic specification of the empirical model is: 
Subsidyi,t =  αi + β1 Ticket Salesi,t-1 + β2 Contributionsi,t-1 + β3 Other Revenuei,t-1 + ηt + εit  (3) 
 To test the fourth and final hypothesis three, models (4) and (5) examine the changes in 
total revenue and expenditures when a school changes conference affiliation.   The basic 
specifications of the empirical models are: 
ΔTotal Revenuei,t = αi + β1 ΔConferencei,t + ηt + εit (4) 
ΔTotal Expendituresi,t = αi + β1 ΔConferencei,t + ηt + εit (5) 
                                                          
13
 A general rule of thumb for outliers suggests any data point three or more standard deviations from the mean is 
defined as an outlier. Total revenue from Oklahoma State University in the year 2006 is excluded because total 
revenue is 9.58 standard deviations from the mean. This is most clearly seen in Figure 2 (Appendix 1), which plots 
Total Revenue and Coaching Staff Expenditures. Oklahoma State's Total Revenue in 2006 was abnormally high 
because of a $165 million donation from alumnus T. Boone Pickens,  the largest single donation given to a NCAA 
athletic department.  
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where i and t are the school and year indices, respectively, αi represents school fixed effects, and 
ηt represents time effects. 
   
IV. Empirical Work 
 
The results from (1) identify the effect of an additional dollar of total revenue on each 
expenditure category, excluding total expenditures (Table 2).  
[Insert Table 2] 
When all colleges are included, an additional dollar of total revenue increases scholarship 
expenditures by $0.02 and coaching staff expenditures by $0.15. Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The coefficients for building and grounds and other 
expenses are not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. The coefficients 
for scholarships and coaching staff suggest that with additional total revenue, expenditures for 
coaches increases 7.5 times the direct expenditures for athletes. 
 The spread between coaching and athlete expenditures is also seen when the model is 
tested on schools in AQ and BCS conferences. In both models, only the coefficients for 
scholarships and coaching staff are statistically significant (at the 1 percent level). When only 
AQ schools are considered, an additional dollar of total revenue increases scholarship 
expenditures by $0.01 and coaching staff expenditures by $0.10, suggesting one more dollar of 
total revenue increases coaching expenditures 10 times more than direct expenditures for 
athletes. For BCS schools, an additional dollar of total revenue increases scholarship 
expenditures by $0.02 and coaching staff expenditures by $0.12. 
 For non-BCS schools, an additional dollar of total revenue increases scholarship 
expenditures by $0.10, coaching staff expenditures by $0.10, building and grounds expenditures 
10 
 
by $0.06, and expenditures for other expenses by $0.12. For non-BCS schools, additional 
revenue increases direct spending for athletes and coaches by the same amount. There are two 
possible explanations for this result. First, non-BCS schools have a more difficult time earning 
revenue (e.g. lack of access to lucrative bowl games, tournaments, and media deals), thus 
constraining the financial packages they can offer coaches. Second, coaches at non-BCS schools 
are more likely to be unproven and therefore cannot command the salary premium coaches at 
BCS schools (specifically AQ schools) earn, keeping coaching expenditures lower for non-BCS 
schools.  
  Since football is often the most profitable and sometimes only profitable sport for a 
school, a small extension to the first model is tested. The models are estimated with a binary 
dummy variable indicating if a school has a football program (Table 3). Since every BCS and 
AQ school has a football program, only the results for all colleges and non-BCS schools are 
shown.  
[Insert Table 3] 
 The inclusion of the football variable does not change the basic results by much. When 
all colleges are included, scholarships and coaching staff remain statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The coefficients are similar to those in Table G; again suggesting expenditures for 
coaches increases 7.5 times the direct expenditures for athletes. The coefficient for football is 
also positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, but only when scholarships is the 
dependent variable. A school with a football team spends on average $780 thousand more on 
scholarships than schools without a football team. This result makes sense because football 
typically requires the largest number of athletes.  NCAA schools can offer 85 scholarships in 
11 
 
football for Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools, 63 scholarships for Football 
Championship Subdivision (FCS) schools, and 36 scholarships for Division II.
14
 
 For non-BCS schools, the coefficients for each of the expenditure categories are positive, 
of similar magnitudes, and of the same statistical significance as the basic model. An additional 
dollar of total revenue increases scholarship expenditures by $0.09, coaching staff expenditures 
by $0.08, building and grounds expenditures by $0.04, and expenditures for other expenses by 
$0.10. Additional revenue increases direct expenditures for athletes 1.125 times the amount for 
coaching expenditures. A non-BCS school with a football team spends $633 thousand more on 
scholarships and $947 thousand more on other expenses than non-BCS schools without a 
football team.  
 Disaggregating the revenue categories, (2) measures how each revenue category affects 
total expenditures (Table 4). 
[Insert Table 4] 
The coefficients for tickets sales are positive and statistically significant in every college 
grouping.  An additional dollar of ticket sale revenue increases total expenditures between $0.45 
and $0.83. An additional dollar of student fees increases total expenditures by $0.36 when all 
colleges are included and $0.66 when only non-BCS conferences are included. An additional 
dollar of school funds increases total expenditures by $0.20 when all colleges are included and 
$0.44 when only non-BCS conferences are included. 
 These coefficients suggest that ticket sales are the most important revenue factor in 
explaining increased expenditures, except for non-BCS conferences, where the coefficient for 
student fees is larger. Schools in BCS and AQ conferences tend to be larger than non-BCS 
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 FBS schools were formerly designated as Division I-A while FCS schools were formerly designated as Division I-
AA. Division III schools do not offer athletic scholarships.  
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schools and have the ability to draw more people to their athletic events. Non-BCS schools are 
more reliant on other sources of revenue, such as student fees, because attendance at their 
sporting events is lower.
15
  
 Like (1), (2) was also estimated with the football dummy variable included (Table 5).  
[Insert Table 5] 
 The inclusion of football does not change the basic results. When all colleges are included, an 
additional dollar of ticket sale revenue increases total expenditures by $0.83, an additional dollar 
of student fees increases total expenditures by $0.32, and an additional dollar of school funds 
increases total expenditures by $0.19. A school with a football team spends slightly more than $2 
million more than schools without a football team. 
 For non-BCS schools, an additional dollar of ticket sale revenue increases total 
expenditures by $0.54, an additional dollar of student fees increases total revenue by $0.59, and 
an additional dollar of school funds increases total expenditures by $0.44. A non-BCS school 
with a football team spends about $1.86 million more than a non-BCS school without a football 
team. 
 With tuition and fees increasing, students, administrators, and legislators are questioning 
the size of athletic subsidies. The only schools that did not give a subsidy to its athletic 
departments in all years were Louisiana State University (LSU) and the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln. The largest athletic subsidy was at the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) in 
2010 ($35.876 million) and the largest athletic subsidy at a BCS or AQ school was at Rutgers 
University in 2011 ($29.125 million). Rutgers University had the three highest single year BCS 
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 For example, in 2012, six of the top seven basketball conferences in terms of attendance were AQ conferences 
(http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Stats/Football/Attendance/index.html). For 
football, the AQ conferences were the top conferences in terms of attendance and the rest of the BCS conferences 
had higher attendance than any of the FCS or Division II and III conferences 
(http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/football_records/Attendance/2012.pdf). 
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or AQ athletic subsidies in the data.  To investigate the degree to which revenue sources act as a 
substitute for school subsidy revenues, (3) utilizes subsidy revenue as the dependent variable and 
each other disaggregated revenue variable as independent variables (Table 6).  
[Insert Table 6] 
 The only revenue variable that is statistically significant is ticket sales, though it is not 
statistically significant when only non-BCS school are considered. As expected, the coefficients 
for ticket sales are negative and between $0.09 and $0.19, suggesting that increased ticket sales 
decreases the athletic subsidy. The large standard deviations of contributions and other revenue 
may help explain the statistical insignificance of the two coefficients. These revenue streams are 
not as reliable as ticket sales and so schools may not depend on them to fund their athletic 
programs. 
 When the dummy variable for football is added to the model, the basic results are similar 
(Table 7).  
[Insert Table 7] 
None of the revenue variables for non-BCS schools are statistically significant, though a non-
BCS school with a football team will have a $4.45 million larger subsidy than a non-BCS school 
without a football team. When all colleges are considered, the coefficient for ticket sales is 
negative and a one dollar increase in ticket sales decreases the athletic subsidy by $0.17. A 
school with a football team has a $4.49 million larger subsidy than a school without a football 
team. The football coefficients support the notion that having a football team is expensive, thus 
the need for a larger athletic subsidy. 
 The fourth and last hypothesis this study examines is the changes in total revenue (4) and 
expenditures (5) when a school changes conference affiliation (Table 8). 
14 
 
[Insert Table 8] 
These results should only be considered a first rough approximation of how a change in 
conference affiliation affects total revenue and expenditures because only 12 schools changed 
conferences in the time period examined. Of the 12 schools, only 3 BCS and 1 AQ schools 
changed conferences. The model is included because the number of schools that have changed 
conferences since 2011 has increased and most schools that change conferences cite financial 
reasons as their main priority. Therefore, the model gives a glimpse as to what may happen to 
total revenue and expenditures for schools that move conferences.  
 The results show that changing conferences increases total revenue and total 
expenditures, but only for BCS and AQ schools.
16
 A BCS school that changes conferences 
increases total revenue by $6.48 million and total expenditures by $5.1 million per year. An AQ 
school that changes conferences increases total revenue by $12.30 million and total expenditures 
by $10.29 million per year. These results illustrate the financial motivation to change 
conferences.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
NCAA athletic departments operate under a unique set of constraints and incentives.  Athletic 
departments claim to not have a profit-seeking primary objective; athletic departments can’t pay 
players (labor); and athletic departments dually operate in private and public markets by 
collecting revenues from selling tickets to private customers,  donations from alumni, and  
subsidies from publicly-funded academic institutions. 
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 The model was also estimated with the football dummy variable, which is dropped from the AQ and BCS college 
groupings because of colinearity. The inclusion of football did not affect the results of the all colleges and non-BCS 
groupings. 
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 This paper empirically investigates the behavior of NCAA Division I athletic 
departments, specifically examining the way in which athletic departments respond to changes in 
revenues.  This paper tested four primary relationships: (1) the effect of total revenue on 
individual expenditure categories, (2) how individual revenue streams changes total 
expenditures, (3) how changes in individual revenue categories changes the size of the athletic 
subsidy, and (4) how total revenue and expenditures change when a school changes conference 
affiliation.  
 The empirical results show that when a school receives additional athletic revenue, 
expenditures for coaches are 7.5 times more than direct expenditures for athletes (in the form of 
scholarships) for all NCAA Division I colleges and this spread can be as high as 10 times when 
only automatic qualifying schools are considered.  Ticket sales are the most important revenue 
stream in explaining increases in total expenditures, particularly for schools in Bowl 
Championship Series or automatic qualifying conferences. For every one dollar increase in ticket 
sale revenue, total expenditures can rise by as much as $0.83. Increasing revenue for ticket sales 
also reduces the subsidy athletic departments receive from schools, by as much as $0.19 for 
every additional dollar of ticket sales revenue. Lastly, the empirical results suggest that changing 
conferences can increase total revenue and total expenditures, but only for schools in Bowl 
Championship Series or automatic qualifying conferences.  
 College athletics is a major source of revenue and expenditures for most colleges and 
universities. As media and licensing deals become more lucrative and costs increase for schools 
to remain competitive, how schools financially support their athletic programs and where the 
money is spent will continue to be an important issue. The empirical exercise in this paper 
16 
 
presents a picture of the revenue and expenditure trends across the NCAA Division I college 
landscape. 
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Table 1 Recent Facility Upgrades at Division I Universities  
 
Team Facility Upgrade 
University of Alabama A $9 million locker room upgrade 
University of Arizona A $378 million north end zone expansion at Arizona Stadium that 
will add about 7,000 seats. 
University of Arkansas A new, $35 million football operations center. 
Baylor University Building a new stadium at estimated cost of $250 million. 
Boise State University A new, $22 million football complex. 
University of California - Berkeley Completely renovating Memorial Stadium at an estimated cost of 
$321 million.  
University of Iowa $57 million plan to build a new practice facility and operations 
building. 
Kansas State University A $75 million project to upgrade west side of Bill Snyder Family 
Stadium. 
Louisiana State University Recently approved $100 million expansion of Tiger Stadium, 
bringing capacity close to 100,000 seats. 
University of Louisville Has begun fundraising for a $7.5 million, 18,000-foot addition to its 
football complex. 
Michigan State University Installing new $10 million scoreboard at Spartans Stadium that will 
be largest in the state. 
Mississippi State University $25 million football complex 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln A $63.5 million expansion of the east side of Memorial Stadium 
that will add about 6,000 seats 
Oklahoma State University A $16 million indoor practice facility, plus new outdoor fields that 
will cost $3 million. 
Ohio State University Spending $7 million for new scoreboard and improved sound 
system and other touches at Ohio Stadium. 
University of Syracuse Upgrading locker rooms and other team areas at a cost of $5 
million. 
University of Tennessee A $45 million new football complex that will contain 145,000 
square feet. 
Texas Christian University $164 million expansion and renovation to Amon G. Carter Stadium  
University of Southern California Scheduled to open the $70 million, 110,000-square foot John 
McKay Center this summer; complex includes locker rooms, 
training areas, football offices and a two-story video board. 
University of Utah Coaches are working in trailers as a new, $30 million football 
complex is being built. 
Virginia Tech University Has announced plans to build a $20 million indoor practice facility. 
University of Washington Work is ongoing on a $250 million renovation of Husky Stadium. 
University of Wisconsin - Madison An $86 million upgrade to locker rooms, weight training and 
academic areas at Camp Randall Stadium, which also got new turf. 
Source: Bennet, 2012 
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Dependent Variables Regressors All Colleges Automatic Qualifiers BCS Conferences Non-BCS Conferences
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.10
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)***
F Statistic 74.95 31.78 38.17 63.11
R-squared (within) 0.51 0.56 0.49 0.61
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.10
(0.021)*** (0.028)*** (0.023)*** (0.031)***
F Statistic 51.81 38.34 40.97 29.15
R-squared (within) 0.44 0.64 0.52 0.16
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.04 -0.005 0.02 0.06
(0.054) (0.065) (0.059) (0.027)**
F Statistic 5.00 2.89† 3.74 5.43
R-squared (within) 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.11
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.12
(0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035)***
F Statistic 7.69 3.39 4.56 9.58
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.15
Number of Schools 225 54 100 125
Number of Observations 1094 265 492 486
Building and Grounds
Other Expenses
Notes: 
The regressions cover years 2006 - 2011. The set of regressors also include school fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term, which are excluded for reasons of space. 
Robust standard errors are  in parentheses. *** = 1% and ** = 5% significance level. All F-Statistics are significant at the 1% level unless marked by †, which indicates 
significance at the 5% level.
Coaching Staff
Table 2: Effect of an additional dollar of total revenue on each expenditure category
Scholarships
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Dependent Variables Regressors All Colleges Non-BCS Conferences
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.02 0.09
(0.004)*** (0.018)***
Football 780.12 633.426
(216.375)*** (194.371)***
F Statistic 70.82 77.44
R-squared (within) 0.52 0.62
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.15 0.08
(0.022)*** (0.029)***
Football 17.67 731.181
(373.149) (500.491)
F Statistic 46.26 24.85
R-squared (within) 0.44 0.17
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.03 0.04
(0.054) (0.020)**
Football 437.15 758.029
(585.442) (572.076)
F Statistic 4.55 4.55
R-squared (within) 0.05 0.13
Total Revenue (t-1) 0.01 0.10
(0.031) (0.034)***
Football 111.48 947.415
(309.300) (289.335)***
F Statistic 14.68 14.05
R-squared (within) 0.04 0.16
Number of Schools 225 125
Number of Observations 1094 486
Notes: 
The regressions cover years 2006 - 2011. The set of regressors also include school fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and a constant term, which are excluded for reasons of space. Robust standard errors are  in 
parentheses. *** = 1% and ** = 5% significance level. The coefficients for Football are in constant 2012 
USD thousands.
Table 3: Effect of an additional dollar of total revenue on each expenditure category, including football
Scholarships
Coaching Staff
Building and Grounds
Other Expenses
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Variable All Colleges
Automatic 
Qualifiers
BCS 
Conferences
Non-BCS 
Conferences
Ticket Sales (t-1) 0.83 0.45 0.63 0.54
(0.16)*** (0.23)* (0.17)*** (0.24)**
Student Fees (t-1) 0.36 0.98 0.15 0.66
(0.15)** (1.02) (0.24) (0.09)***
School Funds (t-1) 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.44
(0.11)* (0.35) (0.16) (0.08)***
Contributions (t-1) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.040 (0.03) (0.030 (0.09)
Other Revenue (t-1) -0.18 -0.11 -0.17 -0.05
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19)
Number of schools 225 54 100 125
Number of observations 1095 266 493 602
F statistic 28.57 11.87 16.59 43.83
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.36 0.32 0.56
Notes: 
Table 4: Expenditure results
The dependent variable is Total Expenses. The regressions cover years 2006 -2011. The set of 
regressors includes school fixed effects, year fixed effects, which are exluced for reasons of 
space. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% 
significance level
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable All Colleges
Non-BCS 
Conferences
Ticket Sales (t-1) 0.83 0.54
(0.16)*** (0.22)**
Student Fees (t-1) 0.32 0.59
(0.15)** (0.08)***
School Funds (t-1) 0.19 0.41
(0.11)* (0.08)***
Contributions (t-1) 0.01 -0.05
(0.04) (0.09)
Other Revenue (t-1) -0.19 -0.08
(0.12) (0.19)
Football 2002.45 1863.72
(1101.21)* (755.33)**
Number of schools 225 125
Number of observations 1095 602
F statistic 28.77 51.4
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.57
Notes: 
Table 5: Expenditure results, including football
The dependent variable is Total Expenses. The 
regressions cover years 2006 -2011. The set 
of regressors includes school fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, which are exluced for reasons of 
space. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 
10% significance level. The coefficients for 
Football are in constant 2012 USD thousands.
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Variable All Colleges
Automatic 
Qualifiers
BCS 
Conferences
Non-BCS 
Conferences
Ticket Sales (t-1) -0.18 -0.09 -0.19 0.54
(0.04)*** (0.05)* (0.05)*** (0.34)
Contributions (t-1) 0.0002 -0.001 -0.0005 0.13
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.17)
Other Revenue (t-1) -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20)
Number of schools 225 54 100 125
Number of observations 1095 266 493 602
F statistic 20.88 2.5† 7.26 19.23
R-squared (within) 0.25 0.06 0.18 0.36
Notes: 
Table 6: Subsidy Results
The dependent variable is Subsidy. The regressions cover years 2006 -2011. The set of 
regressors includes school fixed effects, year fixed effects, which are exluced for reasons of 
space. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% 
significance level. All F-Statistics are significant at the 1% level unless marked by †, which 
indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Variable All Colleges
Non-BCS 
Conferences
Ticket Sales (t-1) -0.17 0.34
(0.04)*** (0.26)
Contributions (t-1) 0.00 -0.01
(0.002) (0.14)
Other Revenue (t-1) -0.03 -0.05
(0.03) (0.18)
Football 4490.10 4456.87
(1618.69)*** (1646.16)***
Number of schools 225 125
Number of observations 1095 602
F statistic 21.88 23.55
R-squared (within) 0.29 0.45
Notes: 
Table 7: Subsidy results, including football
The dependent variable is Subsidy. The 
regressions cover years 2006 -2011. The set 
of regressors includes school fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, which are exluced for reasons of 
space. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 
10% significance level. The coefficients for 
Football are in constant 2012 USD thousands.
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Dependent Variables Regressors All Colleges Automatic Qualifiers BCS Conferences Non-BCS Conferences
Change in Conference 1717.35 12295.18 6476.13 126.09
(1104.59) (2153.48)*** (2935.79)** (197.23)
F Statistic 2.20†† 13.72 2.50† 3.74†
R-squared (within) 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03
Change in Conference 1347.03 10285.35 5109.69 71.46
(988.05) (1319.55)*** (2718.24)* (197.20)
F Statistic 6.31 27.64 4.91 4.46
R-squared (within) 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07
Number of Schools 225 55 100 125
Number of Observations 1094 246 492 602
Table 8: Change of Conference
Change in Total Revenue
Change in Total Expenditure
Notes: 
The regressions cover years 2006 - 2011. The set of regressors also include school fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term, which are excluded for reasons of space. 
Robust standard errors are  in parentheses. *** = 1% and ** = 5% significance level. All F-Statistics are significant at the 1% level unless marked by †, which indicates 
significance at the 5% level or ††, which indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Variable Description Source
Ticket Sales
Includes ticket sales to the public, faculty and students, and money received for shipping 
and handling of tickets. Does not include amounts in excess of face value (such as 
preferential seating) or sales for conference and national tournaments that are pass-through 
transactions.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Student Fees Fees assessed to support athletics.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
School Funds
Includes both direct and indirect support from the university, including state funds, tuition, 
tuition waivers etc. as well as federal Work Study amounts for athletes. It also includes 
university-provided support such as administrative costs, facilities and grounds maintenance, 
security, risk management, utilities, depreciation and debt service.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Contributions
Includes amounts received directly from individuals, corporations, associations, 
foundations, clubs or other organizations by the donor for the operation of the athletics 
program. Report amounts paid in excess of a ticket's value. Contributions include cash, 
marketable securities and in-kind contributions such as dealer-provided cars, apparel and 
drink products for team and staff use. Also includes revenue from preferential seating.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Rights and Licensing
Includes revenue for athletics from radio and television broadcasts, Internet and ecommerce 
rights received from institution-negotiated contracts, the NCAA and conference revenue 
sharing arrangements; ; and revenue from corporate sponsorships, licensing, sales of 
advertisements, trademarks and royalties. Includes the value of in-kind products and services 
provided as part of the sponsorship (e.g., equipment, apparel, soft drinks, water and 
isotonic products).
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Other Revenue
 All other sources of revenue including game guarantees, support from third-parties 
guaranteed by the school such as TV income, housing allowances, camp income, etc.; 
tournament/bowl game revenues from conferences; endowments and investments; revenue 
from game programs, novelties, food or other concessions; and parking revenues and other 
sources.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Total Revenue
Includes Ticket Sales, Student Fees, School Funds, Contributions, Rights and Licensing, 
and Other Revenue.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Scholarships
Athletically-related student aid, including summer school and tuition discounts and waivers 
(including aid given to student-athletes who have exhausted their eligibility or who are 
inactive due to medical reasons), and aid for non-athletes such as student managers.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Coaching Staff
All salaries, bonuses and benefits reported on the university's tax forms for coaches and 
staff, as well as third-party contributions.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Building and Grounds
Facilities costs charged to the athletics program, including debt service, maintenance, utilities 
and rental fees.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Other Expenses
Includes guarantees paid to other schools, severance payments to past coaches and staff, 
recruiting, team travel, equipment and uniforms, game day and camp expenses, fundraising 
and marketing costs, spirit group support, medical expense/insurance and conference dues. 
It also includes expenses charged to athletics by the university, such as building 
maintenance.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Total Expenses Includes Scholarhips, Coaching Staff, Building and Grounds, and Total Expenses.
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
Subsidy Student Fees plus School Funds
USA TODAY public-records requests to 
each university
DConference
Binary dummy variable where DConference = 1 represents a school that has changed 
conference affilitation and DConference = 0 represents a school that has not changed 
conference affiliation.
Individual school websites
Football
Binary dummy variable where Football = 1 represents a school with a football program and 
Football = 0 represents a school without a football program.
Individual school websites
Notes: 
Data from USA Today was compiled by Christopher Schnaars, Jodi Upton, Jerry Mosemak 
and Kristin DeRamus. Reporting by Steve Berkowitz, Erin Durkin and Jodi Upton of USA 
TODAY; and Jason Bailey, Timothy Burnsed, Andrew Crum, Erin Foley, Yasha Ghamarian, 
Erin Glueckert, Thomas Hotchkiss, Zachary Keefer, Younghwan Lim, Eduardo Martinez, 
Amy Mills, Romy Schwaiger and Joshua Weinfuss of Indiana University's National Sports 
Journalism Center. The USA Today data is publicly available here: 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-14/ncaa-college-athletics-
finances-database/54955804/1
Table 9: Variable Description and Sources
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Ticket Sales 5737.757 9596.228 0.5896 62463.13 1326
Student Fees 3838.907 4092.905 0 26377.22 1326
School Funds 4962.781 4546.905 0 33467.59 1326
Contributions 5470.987 10794.68 0 240325.6 1326
Rights and Licensing 6753.376 10138.42 0 47712.88 1326
Other Revenue 2185.991 2795.191 -15874.57 35948 1326
Total Revenue 28950.38 28676.48 2259.023 274880.6 1326
Scholarships 4675.963 2794.828 0 16661.02 1326
Coaching Staff 9358.433 8728.737 0 50944.74 1326
Buildings and Grounds 3431.088 5985.007 0 44191.15 1326
Other Expenses 10336.53 9960.958 0 69577.75 1326
Total Expenses 27820.79 25967.34 2731.44 137338.3 1326
Subsidy 8801.688 5376.117 0 35876.32 1326
Dconference 0.011 0.1058 1 1 1326
Football 0.8137 0.3894 0 1 1326
Note: Revenue and Expenditure categories, including Subsidy, are in constant 2012 USD (in thousands).
Table 10: Summary Statistics
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Figure 1: Highest Paid Public Employee By State (2011-2012) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Reuben Fischer-Baum of Deadspin.com (http://deadspin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-
employee-a-co-489635228) 
* In Pennsylvania, Penn State, the University of Pittsburgh, and Temple University are "state-related" schools and 
do not have the same disclosure requirements as public schools.  
** As noted by Mr. Fischer-Baum, "It's difficult to track down salary information for employees at Ole Miss and 
Mississippi State, but the highest non-coach salaries we could find top out at around $500,000. While we can't prove 
that nobody [sic] at these schools earns more than Dan Mullen's [Mississippi State's football coach] $2.65 million 
per year, we think it's very unlikely." 
 
 The data in the map were compiled by comparing public government and university 
salary databases to public coaching contracts on a state-by-state basis. In an email 
correspondence, Mr. Fischer-Baum confirmed that the details of many of the contracts could 
only be gleaned from "trusted media reports" and that the "results of this map were 
independently fact-checked by Harper's Magazine for use in their July Harper's Index." Given 
these caveats, this figure should only be used anecdotally. 
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Figure 2: Total Athletic Revenue and Coaching Staff Expenditures, 2006 – 2011 
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